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One of the many myths that populate the field of
gender and development is one that claims that
gender has been so successfully mainstreamed into
development policy that there is now little need for
women’s projects and programmes, or indeed for
women’s policy units. The job of creating “gender
awareness” is done. After all, the argument goes,
the major development agencies and the significant
donors have all incorporated clear commitments
to ensuring that women are adequately taken into
account at all stages of development policy.1 The
view that gender awareness has become part of the
common sense of development policy is now so
widespread that non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) report a growing ennui, a “gender fatigue”
in metropolitan policy arenas with women’s
programmes increasingly being seen as passé.2
At least one of these claims is hard to refute. No
reputable international NGO has been without its
gender-sensitive guidelines for some decades and
now, the power centres of development policy have
followed suit. The UN was not surprisingly among
the first to mainstream gender across its many
agencies, but the World Bank has for some time also
incorporated gender diagnostics into its various
guidelines. The World Development Report 2000/2001
(WDR) went as far as to state that gender inequality
is ‘of such pervasive significance that it deserves
extra emphasis compared with other inequalities’
(World Bank 2001). The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Guidelines on
Poverty Reduction (2001) also seem to offer proof
of this institutionalised gender awareness; here
gender inequality is cited as a ‘major cause’ of poverty.
And one of the Millennium Development Goals is
‘to promote gender equality and empower women’.
Such policy commitments are hard won, and
they are not to be dismissed as being without any
significance. They can influence policy direction
and they can provide those pressing for positive
policy outcomes with some leverage. On the other
hand, they are fragile gains, and they can remain
ineffective, purely formal, without teeth or support
for implementation. Hostile lobbies at home and
abroad resist and ignore them, selectively adopt
them or interpret them in ways which are cynically
instrumental or simply counterproductive.
The main development institutions, for all their
encouraging rhetoric have a mixed record in
applying gender sensitive recommendations. The
evidence indicates a significant gap between the
gender equality guidelines and the practice.
Evaluations of World Bank programmes are but
one instance. An investigation carried out by its
own Gender Unit into 100 Bank projects concludes
that gender issues were ‘widely neglected’ (cited in
Francis 2001). Other evaluations, of Poverty
Reduction Strategies have found similar results,
one commenting that there was no attempt to deal
with the specificity of women’s poverty (Bradshaw
and Linneker 2003). Another evaluation, developed
with support from the Bank, found that issues of
gender equality and women’s and men’s differential
access to resources and opportunities, were not
taken into account in most analyses and policy
proposals. The author reported that the poverty
diagnoses were ‘astonishingly gender-blind, genuine
mainstreaming [was] quite limited and many key
chapters were void of any reference to gender’.
Further findings were that ‘women were frequently
lumped together with other vulnerable and
disempowered groups, notably children and the
disabled’. The report concluded that gender analysis
was ‘either absent or highly unsatisfactory’, and the
policy actions suggested were often ‘exceedingly
vague’ (viz: ‘improve conditions for women’). Where
lip service is paid to gender mainstreaming there
is little tangible ‘on what this means or how to do
it’ (De Vylder 2003).
The development agencies might claim, with
varying degrees of justification, that they do not
bear sole responsibility for these outcomes since
programmes are usually developed and
implemented by governments or in collaboration
with them. Governments naturally vary in the
support they give to gender equality and women’s
projects, and in how far such support is backed up
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by adequate institutionalisation and funding.
Lamentably, we face a shortage of publicly available
studies of how governments conceptualise, design
and manage development programmes. This is
strikingly true in regard to the growing numbers
of poverty relief programmes which have appeared
in the wake of the World Bank’s New Poverty
Agenda (NPA), launched in 1990. The NPA
incorporates many good ideas that originated on
the creative margins of development practice
summed up in the triad of “empowerment, voice
and presence”, and an acknowledgement of the
multidimensional character of poverty. Yet reports
from Latin American ministries responsible for
poverty programmes show that such ideas are still
only vaguely reflected in policy design and
implementation.3 Meanwhile, poverty programmes
remain in many cases badly managed, highly
clientelised and inefficiently administered with
responsibility spread across different government
departments leading to a lack of coordination and
consistency in approach. Poor statistical collection
and evaluation procedures add to the lack of reliable
data for policy feedback processes measurements.
Also, indicators used to assess the scope and
magnitude of poverty are still rarely disaggregated
to show sex difference.
Women’s organisations find it hard to make an
impact on social policy provision in such
circumstances. Feminist NGOs have often
pioneered projects that incorporate principles of
gender justice, and have been able to develop their
own research capacity considerably in recent years
allowing closer attention to women’s needs. Yet in
most poverty relief schemes, their influence is largely
confined to local or small-scale project design. It is
not unknown for policy-makers to argue that there
is no need to incorporate a gender dimension in
their poverty programmes since policies that benefit
the poor ‘necessarily benefit women’, eliding women
with poverty in a simple reduction that exports
gender analysis altogether. This attitude has
reportedly surfaced in relation to Lula’s Zero Hunger
campaign, which is surprising given the strength
of the women’s movement in Brazil and its historic
association with the ruling party.
It would not be overstating the case, given this
scenario, to conclude that despite the formal
recognition of the gender-poverty link, anti-poverty
programmes have remained for the most part
innocent of gender analysis and as a result they
ignore women’s particular circumstances, and rarely
problematise gender relations. They therefore
remain locked into dated conceptions of “gender
roles” which fail to correspond to the realities of
most poor women’s lives and therefore do not meet
their needs. For example, anti-poverty programmes
place considerable reliance on women performing
voluntary work, and assuming sole responsibility
for children. Yet most low-income households are
dependent on women’s capacity to contribute
money incomes and the demands of these
programmes risk further weakening their tenuous
hold on the labour market. The feeble efforts at
“capacity building” associated with many of these
projects confers few marketable skills. It goes
without saying that food programmes, still a major
plank of poverty relief, depend on assumptions
about food preparation and provision being
women’s natural role, thereby reinforcing normative
gender divisions at the fulcrum of such policies.
Moreover, for all the talk of participation few of
these programmes do much to incorporate women
into the various stages of their planning and
implementation, training in useful skills is weak or
non-existent, and as a consequence programme
participants are rarely provided with the means to
achieve a sustainable escape from poverty. This
latter point goes to the heart of the problem with
the anti-poverty agenda.
The current emphasis on poverty relief in
development policy is worrying enough, in that it
stands for the failure of macroeconomic and
development policy to generate adequate levels of
growth. Poverty relief programmes have proved no
palliative in dealing with the effects of economic
policy and have offered little to the poor in a context
of deepening inequality. Effective poverty relief can
only come about when linked to sustainable
development strategies, which are currently thin
on the ground. But there is a failure of another kind,
evident in the token, partial and selective
incorporation of gender and gender equality
principles into public/international policy.
Macroeconomic policy has remained highly resistant
to gender critique notwithstanding the well-
documented evidence of the negative impacts it
can have on women’s employment, well-being and
livelihoods. The mass entry of women into low-
paid, informalised and insecure employment over
recent decades can hardly be counted as a sign of
economic policy success. Neither is the targeting
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of women in anti-poverty programmes necessarily
a step forward when they are only “visibilised” in
their roles as mothers and unpaid “volunteer”
workers. Here the gender blindness at the “top” of
the policy pyramid is only replicated, and its effects
multiplied, on those at the sharp end.
Considerable caution therefore needs to be
exercised in any assessment of the impact of gender
mainstreaming in international policy guidelines.
Yet, if the spread of gender awareness and the impact
of mainstreaming is exaggerated, how do we explain
the current gender ennui when so much is still at
stake? One thing is clear – it has less to do with a
surplus of success and more to do with a changed
zeitgeist brought about by the post-2000 darkening
international political climate, more effective
strategising and alliance building by conservative
forces – popular, governmental and faith based –
and last but not least, the less than woman-friendly
policy mission of the most powerful nation in the
world. But there has also occurred a troubling loss
of vitality and direction of some feminist movements,
the specific causes of which vary from region to
region. While there are still vital movements in Latin
America and parts of Africa and South Asia, all
regions report some loss of dynamism. This has gone
along with a critical reassessment of the Beijing
process, with doubts expressed as to its
representativity, the content of its proposals, and
the universalist pretentions of the overall project.
Even among those who can be counted as
broadly sympathetic to the aims of Beijing, opinion
is divided over how to evaluate the gains that were
made from the “globalisation of feminism”. For
sceptics, the glass is half-empty rather than half-
full. Their concern is that the transformative agenda
has been captured by power, co-opted and
instrumentalised, and its political vision has been
neutralised, where not excised. Some worry that
feminism’s original and critical aim – to eradicate
social inequalities and to create new forms of social
life and political practice – has been abandoned.
Others doubt that an international women’s
movement can now be said to exist: the editors of
one collection of work by activists and scholars
reflecting on Beijing express a concern that women’s
movements and feminism may have become ‘an
expression of women’s integration into hegemonic
patriarchal institutions where they are reduced to
a lobbying group, an appendix without influence’
(Braig and Wolte 2002: 6).
This scepticism has two aspects. One, often
found among policy practitioners, is based on an
evaluation of the policy record of three decades of
activism, domestically and internationally. Here,
issues of bureaucratisation, NGO-isation,
technification of the women’s movement are
foregrounded. The other aspect is of a somewhat
different kind, deriving as it does from a theoretical
position that sees integration into existing states
and international institutions as, in itself, an
abandonment of the broader, “critical” and, at least
implicitly, revolutionary goals of much second-
wave feminism.
No amount of national policy initiatives, quotas,
or international norms and conventions will assuage
this latter concern. However, in viewing the feminist
influence on international legal instruments as
primarily cosmetic, there is a tendency to underplay
the positive impact that this legislation has had on
national law and policy. Those who see the glass as
half-full stress that legal gains are significant, and
cite the example of CEDAW (Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women), the most important piece of international
legislation encoding women’s rights, which commits
171 signing governments to respect a range of
principles that have in some regions (notably Latin
America) and countries led to positive reforms in
constitutions and civil codes. Much of course depends
on the will of governments and the energies of
women’s movements to put flesh on these bones,
and there are wide regional disparities in what has
been, and can be, done with these instruments.
CEDAW has the distinction among international
conventions of having the most reservations or
“bracketed clauses”. Yet as the history of working
class and female suffrage demonstrates, reform
processes are by their very nature slow. They
encounter enormous institutional and often political
resistance, as is evident in the mobilisation at the UN
level of opportunistic conservative coalitions (US-
Vatican-Islamist) against women’s reproductive rights.
Any consideration of Beijing necessarily
problematises the significance of the advances made
possible by human rights legislation. The human
rights instruments and discourse helped to globalise
women’s movement activism combining advocacy
in international arenas with national, regional and
local initiatives. Some Asian and African, and most
Latin American and Caribbean women’s
movements, have based their struggles for economic
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and social rights on international human rights
instruments. Which rights matter is the key question
for those women’s movements who have often
situated their demands increasingly within a
framework which counterposes an ethic of justice
expressed in socio-economic rights to the prevailing
“thin” utilitarian version of rights.4 Human rights
instruments have enabled women’s movements to
provide a normative and analytic framework for
fighting against discrimination, reframing socio-
economic injustices against women as human rights
violations. The examples of education, quota laws,
violence against women, and health show how
rights discourses can be deployed to legitimise
women’s demands for the improvement of their
legal status, political representation and well-being.
Convenient though it may be for some
governments (and some identity-based political
movements) to oppose human rights legislation on
the grounds that it is an alien Western imposition,
ideas of rights and justice are not the sole property
of “the West” and, in an increasingly
transnationalised world, they have acquired both
local and regional resonance. Liberal conceptions
of rights have their origins in the West, but their
meaning has been contested, radicalised, extended
and pluralised over the course of their history. But
if these ideas are to be part of a genuine global
conversation, they require some translation and
adaptation to local contexts. The
transnationalisation of a debate about gender justice
has accompanied the diversification of the global
women’s movement and has established the idea
of feminisms in the plural. At the same time, debates
over women’s rights have become more intensely
regionalised in recent years, demanding closer
scrutiny to the particular context within which they
are framed and fought for. There is some greater
awareness of the political and ethical dimensions
of the interface between global instruments and
local settings than at the onset of the Beijing process
and this might turn out to be an area where the
glass appears more full than empty. Respect for
difference, but anchored within a movement essentially
concerned with equality and justice, and in a world
of ever deepening social and economic inequalities
and political conflict, still has its place.
To those who think that gender equality is passé
it is worth remembering that women are not a “social
problem” to be solved or a minoritarian
constituency. Whatever the current priority in
development policy is deemed to be, and however
these priorities change, gender analysis will remain
an indispensable adjunct to any programme or
policy development process. But if it is to be more
than another policy tool, it needs to be accompanied
by some strategy for achieving gender justice as part
of a broader commitment to greater social and
economic equality. That is unlikely to happen
without the political will, vision and strategy
provided by collective action. This, perhaps is the
main lesson of Beijing – and of its aftermath.
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Notes
1. The Dutch government’s rationale for cutting financial
support to the United Nations Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM) was reportedly along these lines.
2. This was the fate of the pioneering Nicaraguan feminist
NGO Puntos de Encuentro which had to close most of
its programmes due to lack of funding – discussed in
Molyneux and Lazar (2003). 
3. Research I carried out for a forthcoming United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)
publication on the new social policy and anti-poverty
programmes in Latin America.
4. See Molyneux and Razavi (2003) for a fuller discussion
of these issues.
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